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INVESTIGATIONS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Department of Commerce (the DOC) has faced 
considerable criticism for the way it implements trade remedies. 1 
Although U.S. trade laws2 are almost identical to the texts of the most 
important international agreements,3 the DOC’s implementation of the 
laws differs from most countries. The DOC’s implementation processes 
that lead to so-called “double counting,” are some of the most 
controversial.4  
Double counting arises in the market economy (ME) context when 
countervailing duties (CVDs) and antidumping duties (ADs) are 
concurrently applied to remedy an export subsidy. 5  The concurrent 
application of these two duties causes double counting because the 
calculation of the dumping margin in the AD investigation also 
incorporates the impact of an export subsidy.6 This process assumes that 
the subsidy is passed through the recipient manufacturer to reduce export 
prices, rendering at least part of the concurrent AD duties double 
counted.7   
In the ME context, double counting is only problematic if the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1 See Lauren W. Clarke, Note, The Market-Oriented Enterprise Approach: The Best Responses 
to the Questionable United States Trade Practices Scrutinized in GPX International Tire Corp. v. 
United States, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 837 (2011); Christopher Blake McDaniel, Sailing the Seas 
of Protectionism: The Simultaneous Application of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties to 
Nonmarket Economies—An Affront to Domestic and International Laws, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
741, 742 (2009-2010); Kimberly A. Tracey, Non-Market Economy Methodology under U.S. Anti-
Dumping Laws: A Protectionist Shield from Chinese Competition, 15 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 
81, 81 (2006). 
2 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006), amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 
U.S.C. § 2501 (1979); Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2006), amended by Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (1979). 
3  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 
1994]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.doc (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement]; Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
4 See PHILIP BENTLEY & AUBREY SILBERSTON, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING ACTION: 
LIMITS IMPOSED BY ECONOMIC AND LEGAL THEORY 8 (2007) (“[D]iversity is a prevalent 
characteristic of the way anti-dumping and countervailing action is taken by different WTO member 
countries.”); McDaniel, supra note 1, at 742. 
5 See BENTLEY & SILBERSTON, supra note 4, at 31. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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subsidy is an export subsidy. This is because a domestic subsidy affects 
export and domestic pricing equally.8 As a result, the subsidy should not 
give rise to a difference between export prices and domestic prices.9  
The phenomenon of double counting in the ME context, where there 
are concurrent AD and CVD investigations involving export subsidies 
has long been recognized, is addressed in Article VI:5 of the GATT 
1994. This Article prohibits the concurrent application of ADs and CVDs 
that compensate for the same situation of dumping or export 
subsidization.10 
Double counting arises in the non-market economy (NME) context 
when there is a domestic subsidy, as opposed to an export subsidy.11  
This is attributable to the unique nature of the NME AD methodology the 
DOC applies, which uses either surrogate country factors of production 
or prices to estimate the normal value of a similar product. 12  The 
development of a double counting issue in the NME context is a 
relatively recent and controversial phenomenon. Historically, the DOC 
did not conduct CVD investigations when the exporting country was a 
NME country.13 This was a result of the difficulties involved in isolating 
countervailable subsidies from general economic central planning.14   
The policy of not applying CVDs to NME countries changed, with 
respect to the People’s Republic of China (China), in 2006.15 That year 
the DOC determined that China’s economy was sufficiently market-like 
to apply CVDs.16 In spite of this transition to treating China as a ME 
country for the purpose of CVD investigations, the DOC has persisted in 
applying the NME AD methodology in investigations and administrative 
reviews involving China. 17  It is this inconsistent treatment that 
potentially gives rise to duplicative remedies for which the DOC is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 GATT 1994, supra note 3; see BENTLEY & SILBERSTON, supra note 4, at 30–31.  The DOC 
makes an automatic adjustment for double remedies in concurrent investigations of export subsidies 
in ME countries, because an export subsidy is assumed to result in a lower export price, because it 
creates an incentive for export sales over domestic sales. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 
F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1241 n.9 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009); see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(2006). 
11 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677.  The NME AD methodology is itself controversial because it typically 
results in duties that are significantly higher than those calculated using the ME methodology, 
thereby incentivizing overuse in the interest of protectionism.  See generally BENTLEY & 
SILBERSTON, supra note 4, at 19.  This incentive is due to the use of surrogate country data, the 
application of the country-wide rate of facts available and the drawing of adverse inferences in 
choosing among the available facts.  See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-231, U.S.-
CHINA TRADE: ELIMINATING NON MARKET ECONOMY METHODOLOGY WOULD LOWER 
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES FOR SOME CHINESE COMPANIES 12–13, 22 (2006). 
12 Id. 
13  See GPX, 645 F. Supp .2d at 1236; James P. Durling, Encountering Rocky Shoals: 
Application of the CVD Law to China, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUCATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE UPDATE, 2010 WL 956090, at *1–2 (Feb. 25 2010). 
14 Id. 
15 See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1237. 
16 Id. 
17 See, e.g., Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China, 
72 Fed. Reg. 43,591(Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 6, 2007) (initiation of AD invest.). 
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routinely criticized.18 
While the DOC has been heavily criticized for its concurrent 
application of CVD and NME AD remedies with respect to China, the 
statute Congress passed authorizing the DOC to apply CVDs to NME 
countries and requiring the DOC to consider the potential for duplicative 
remedies effectively addresses the problem of double counting.  
However, the potential for duplicative remedies in concurrent NME AD 
and CVD investigations depends entirely on whether the NME AD 
methodology fully accounts for both dumping and the impact of a 
domestic subsidy.19 This is highly dependent on whether the recipient of 
the countervailable domestic subsidy, typically a foreign manufacturer, 
uses the subsidy to lower prices. 20  Additionally, the DOC’s 
implementation of the statute demonstrates that the hotly contested issue 
of duplicative remedies is a nullity in terms of the scope of remedies 
applied. 
Antidumping laws address price discrimination by providing relief to 
domestic industries that have been or are threatened by the adverse 
impact of imports sold in the U.S. market at prices shown to be less than 
fair market value.21 U.S. AD laws22 permit The DOC to impose duties if 
the International Trade Administration (ITA) of The DOC determines 
that foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the U.S. at 
less than fair value. 23  Furthermore, the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC) considers whether an industry24 in the United States 
is materially injured, threatened with material injury, or that the 
establishment of an industry is materially retarded due to non-negligible 
imports of the subject merchandise.25 
Countervailing duty laws combat subsidization by providing relief to 
domestic industries that have been or are threatened with the adverse 
impact of illegally subsidized imported goods that can be sold at lower 
prices than similar goods produced in the United States.26 These laws27 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
18 See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 1, at 742. 
19 See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1236. (“The NME AD statute overlaps with the functioning of 
the CVD statute . . . Thus, the AD and CVD law when applied to NME countries both work to 
correct government distortion of market prices”). 
20 Id. 
21 Vivian C. Jones, Trade Remedies: A Primer, in Trade Remedies 1, 3 (Alan B. Tippton & 
Charles M. Roylton eds., 2008).  
22 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006), amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 
U.S.C. § 2501(1979); see also Antidumping Agreement supra note 3. 
23 Dumping or selling at less than fair value is defined as selling a product in the U.S. at a price 
that is less than the price for which a like product is sold in the home market, the normal value, after 
adjustments for differences in merchandise, quantities purchased, and circumstances of sale.  19 
U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677 (2006). 
24 The ITC must first define the domestic like product and the domestic industry.  Id. § 1677 
25 Id. § 1673. See Jones, supra note 21, at 1.  Negligible imports are imports from the country 
subject to investigation that account for less than 3% of the volume of all such merchandise imported 
into the U.S. in the most recent 12-month period. 19 U.S.C. § 1677. 
26See Richard Diamond, A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration 
of United States Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 507, 533–534 (1989-1990); 
Jones, supra note 21, at 3.  This is referred to as the ‘entitlement’ model.  Diamond, supra, at 517.  
Alternative theories on the justification for countervailing duties include deterrence (see id. at 525) 
SUMMER 2014                       Putting the Specter of Double Counting to Rest 
142 
 
authorize The DOC to impose duties if the ITA finds that the 
government, or any public entity of a foreign country, has provided a 
countervailable subsidy28 for the manufacture, production, or export of 
the merchandise, and if the ITC determines that a U.S. industry has 
suffered injury as a result.29 Both AD and CVD investigations may be 
initiated by interested parties,30 either on behalf of a domestic industry,31 
or by the ITA on its own initiative.32 
This paper discusses how the issue of double counting has been 
addressed in U.S. case law and at the WTO. This paper also evaluates 
whether, under The DOC’s current implementation of U.S. trade law, the 
U.S. is in compliance with its international obligations. Section II 
explains the background and implementation of the U.S. AD and CVD 
statutes. Section III examines the treatment of double remedies in U.S. 
case law. Section IV analyzes the WTO panel and Appellate Body 
(“AB”) decisions in US–AD/ CVD. Section V addresses the statute 
recently passed by Congress following the GPX case and U.S. AD and 
CVD cases, and explains how The DOC’s implementation of the statute 
adequately addresses potentially duplicative remedies. Finally, Section 
VI discusses the relevance of the sun setting provision in China’s 
Accession Protocol to the WTO and the impact it has on the issue of 
double counting. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and the correction of market distortions.  See id. at 515–516; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 443, 445 (1978).  It is not clear that any of these models adequately explain the 
DOC’s methodology of enforcing U.S. CVD laws.  See Diamond, supra, at 532–533, 540. 
27 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2006), amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 
U.S.C. § 2501 (1979).  See also SCM Agreement, supra note 3, at 14. 
28 A subsidy is countervailable if there is a financial contribution that confers a benefit to the 
specific enterprise or industry under investigation.  19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006); see also SCM 
Agreement, supra note 3, at 14.  There are three types of countervailable subsidies: export, import 
substitution, and domestic.  The first two categories are defined by statute as being specific, and 
therefore countervailable; for domestic subsidies the DOC must apply a ‘specificity’ test to 
determine if the subsidy is countervailable.  19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006). 
29 Jones, supra note 21, at 1.  The injury determination is only necessary if the exporting country 
is a party to the WTO Subsidies Agreement or has entered into a similar agreement with or assumed 
similar obligations with respect to the U.S.  Id. at 7. 
30  See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (2006).  Interested parties are defined as a manufacturer, 
producer, or wholesaler in the U.S. of a domestic like product; a certified or recognized union or 
group of workers that is representative of the industry engaged in the manufacture, production, or 
wholesale in the U.S. of a domestic like product; a trade or business association, a majority of whose 
members manufacture, produce, or wholesale a domestic like product in the U.S.; an association of 
firms, unions, or trade associations; and, in cases involving processed agricultural products, a 
collation or trade association representative of processors, or processors and producers, or processors 
and growers.  Id. § 1677. 
31 The petition must be supported by a majority of the domestic industry, such that the workers 
or producers supporting the petition represent at least 25% of the total production of the domestic 
like product and account for more than 50% of the production of the domestic like product produced 
by that portion of the industry supporting or opposing the petition.  Id. §§ 1671, 1673.  If the petition 
to initiate antidumping or countervailing duties does not establish support of domestic producers or 
workers accounting for more than 50% of total production of the domestic like product, the DOC is 
to poll the industry to establish support.  Id. §§ 1671, 1673. 
32 See id. §§ 1671, 1673.  
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II. BACKGROUND: HOW THE AD AND CVD STATUTES WORK 
Trade remedy laws are intended to ensure that domestic industries 
are not injured by unfair foreign competition in the domestic market.33  
The DOC applies ADs and CVDs to offset unfair competitive advantages 
attributable to foreign price discrimination and subsidization. 34  
Advocates of the United States’ trade remedies policy claim these 
measures are necessary to mitigate the adverse impact of various trade 
practices on domestic industries and workers. 35  On the other hand, 
opponents allege ADs and CVDs are little more than poorly disguised 
acts of protectionism.36 
In initial AD investigations and subsequent administrative reviews, 
The DOC utilizes different methodologies depending on whether the 
exporting country is a ME country or a NME country.37 Under the ME 
AD methodology, The DOC calculates the dumping margin by 
comparing the like product when destined for consumption in the 
exporting country 38  with the export price. 39  Under the NME AD 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
33  IMPORT ADMINISTRATION, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, IMPORT 
ADMINISTRATION ANTIDUMPING MANUAL 3 (2009). 
34 Id. at 3–4. 
35  See Jones, supra note 21, at 1; see also THOMAS SCHOENBAUM, ANTIDUMPING AND 
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES AND THE GATT: AN EVALUATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFIED 
REMEDY FOR UNFAIR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (1987); Garrett E. Lynam, Using WTO 
Countervailing Duty Law to Combat Illegally Subsidized Chinese Enterprises Operating in a 
Nonmarket-Economy: Deciphering the Writing on the Wall, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 739, 742 
(2010); Frank Vargo, NAM Welcomes Quick Fix to Offset China’s Subsidies, SHOPFLOOR.ORG 
(March 1, 2012) http://shopfloor.org/2012/03/nam-welcomes-quick-fix-to-offset-chinas-
subsidies/24178. 
36 See generally Kara Loridas, United States-China Trade War: Signs of Protectionism in A 
Globalized Economy?, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 403, 414 (2011) (“China… complains of 
being the victim of protectionist measures by developed countries, namely the United States.”); 
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 35, at 1; McDaniel, supra note 1, at 742; Dan Ikenson, Congress Poised 
to Escalate U.S.-China Trade War, FORBES (February 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2012/02/29/congress-poised-to-escalate-u-s-china-trade-
war/. 
37 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006).  The International Trade Administration (ITA) is responsible for 
designating countries as NME countries, and any determination that a foreign country is a NME 
country remains in effect until specifically revoked by the ITA.  JONES, TIPPTON & ROYLTON, supra 
note 21, at 46–47.  A NME country is defined as any foreign country that the administering authority 
determines does not operate according to market principles.  A NME designation is based on the 
extent to which (1) the country’s currency is convertible; (2) its wage rates result from free 
bargaining between labor and management; (3) joint ventures or other foreign investments are 
permitted; (4) the government owns or controls the means of production; (5) the government 
controls the allocation of resources and price and output decisions.  19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006).  The 
following countries are designated as NME countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, 
Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.  Any determination that 
a foreign country is a NME country remains in effect until revoked by the ITA.  19 U.S.C. § 1677 
(2006). 
38 ADA Art. 2.1.  If there is not a sufficient volume of home market sales to calculate the normal 
value, if home market sales by the exporter account for less than 5% of the quantity of the sales by 
the exporter to the U.S. market,  normal value is based on the price for which the product is sold in a 
surrogate third country.  Id. § 1677 (2006); Statement of Administrative Action on the Uruguay 
Round, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 (1994).  If there is not a viable third country, normal value may be 
based on constructed value, which is calculated by adding manufacturing costs of the merchandise in 
the home market country, selling, general and administrative expenses and profits, and packaging 
costs.  19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006). 
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methodology, The DOC uses surrogate country40 factors of production to 
calculate the normal value. It then compares normal value to the export 
price to derive the dumping margin.41 The factors of production used 
include: (a) hours of labor required, (b) quantities of raw materials 
employed, (c) amounts of energy and other utilities consumed, and (d) 
representative capital cost, including depreciation. 42  The surrogate 
country methodology that the DOC uses in NME AD cases 43  fully 
incorporates the impact of a domestic subsidy provided by the foreign 
government, assuming the subsidy affects export prices. This is because 
the surrogate country value approximates the unsubsidized price of 
goods in the NME domestic market, while the export price reflects the 
impact of the domestic subsidy. 
The assumption that a domestic subsidy is entirely passed on to 
export prices is a major assumption, and one that is strongly disputed by 
The DOC.44 The DOC maintains that the existence of a double remedy 
depends on whether subsidies pass through, pro rata, to U.S. (export) 
prices. An adjustment for duplicative remedies is only necessary for 
countervailable subsidies, which are passed-through to lower export 
prices. If a subsidy does not lower export prices it will not affect the 
dumping margin, and therefore it will not give rise to a double counting 
problem in concurrent AD and CVD investigations.   
Economic theory suggests that any domestic subsidies that impact 
marginal cost could be passed on to export prices.45 Any subsidy that 
varies with the amount of units produced will affect marginal cost.46 
Similarly, subsidies that make production more efficient, such as a grant 
to build a new plant or facility that is more efficient than the old facility, 
would reduce marginal cost.47 Assuming that at least some degree of 
subsidies lower marginal costs and export prices, when The DOC 
conducts concurrent AD and CVD investigations and accounts for 
domestic subsidies they are essentially double counting the effect of such 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
39 The price at which a product is sold in the U.S. is called the export price (EP) if the first sale 
in the U.S. is to a non-affiliated entity.  Id. § 1677. If the first sale in the U.S. is to an entity that is 
affiliated with the exporter, a constructed export price (CEP) is used where the CEP is the price of 
the first sale to a non-affiliated entity in the U.S.  Id. § 1677. 
40 See id. § 1677.  The surrogate country must be a market economy country that is at a 
comparable level of economic development to the NME country and a significant producer of 
comparable merchandise.  Id. § 1677. 
41 See id. § 1677.  If the normal value cannot be determined based on a valuation of the factors 
of production in a surrogate country, the DOC can use the market price of merchandise comparable 
to the subject merchandise in the surrogate country.  See id. § 1677. 
42 Id. § 1677. 
43 There is no double remedy problem for domestic subsidies in ME AD cases, because the 
foreign producer's or exporter's own prices, however they may be affected by such subsidies, are 
used to calculate the AD margins.  See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 n.9. 
44 Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, ¶ 14.51, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter AD/CVD Panel Report]; 
GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. 
45 See Diamond, supra note 26, at 538–539. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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subsidies.48 
Unlike the AD laws that specifically include a methodology for 
investigations of imports from NME countries49 through their various 
iterations, 50  the CVD laws have never referenced investigations of 
imports from NME countries.51 Prior to 2007, the U.S. did not apply 
CVDs to NME countries as a matter of policy.52 In a 1984 determination 
resulting from two investigations of steel wire rod from Czechoslovakia 
and Poland, the ITA determined that there is no adequate way to 
disaggregate government actions in centrally controlled economies. 
Therefore, the ITA has no way to measure subsidies or the market 
distortions caused by subsidies.53 The Court of International Trade (CIT) 
reversed the ITA’s decision and held that CVD law can be applied to 
NME countries. 54  However, the CIT decision was subsequently 
overturned in Georgetown Steel where the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) ruled that The DOC’s original position taken 
from the ITA was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.55 
In 2007, the ITA reversed its position on the application of CVDs to 
NME countries in a CVD investigation that dealt with paper imported 
from China.56 In its preliminary investigation, the ITA concluded that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
48 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-474, U.S.-CHINA TRADE: 
COMMERCE FACES PRACTICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES IN APPLYING COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 28 
(2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05474.pdf; see also 
Brian D. Kelly, The Offsetting Duty Norm and the Simultaneous Application of Countervailing and 
Antidumping Duties, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 17 (Sept. 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653631. 
49 See 19 U.S.C..§ 1677 (2006). 
50 See Philip D. O'Neill Jr, United States Countervailing Duty Law: Renewed, Revamped and 
Revisited – Trade Act of 1974, 17 B.C. L. REV. 832, 833-837 (1976), available at 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol17/iss5/4; Kevin C.  Kennedy,  An Examination Of 
Domestic Subsidies And The Standard For Imposing Countervailing Duties, 9 LOY. L.A. INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 1, 1–5 (1986); Julie Dunne, Delverde and the WTO's British Steel Decision 
Foreshadow More Conflict Where the WTO Subsidies Agreement, Privatization, and United States 
Countervailing Duty Law Intersect, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 86–87 (2001). 
51 Vivian C. Jones, Trade Remedy Legislation: Applying Countervailing Action to Nonmarket 
Economy Countries, in TRADE REMEDIES 43, 43 (2008).  As a result, the administering authorities 
have no specific statutory factors to consider or methodologies to use when identifying subsidies in 
NME countries.  Id. at 63.  See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1236 (“Congressional silence regarding 
the application of the CVD law to NME countries may indicate that Congress never anticipated that 
the CVD law would be applied while a country remained designated as an NME country.”). 
52 See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1236; Dukgeun Ahn & Jieun Lee, Countervailing Duty against 
China: Opening a Pandora’s Box in the WTO System? 4 (GERALD R. FORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC 
POLICY, THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 615, 
2011), available at http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers601-625/r615.pdf. 
53 In Carbon steel wire rod from Czechoslovakia and Carbon steel wire rod from Poland, the 
ITA concluded that a “bounty or grant” within the meaning of the CVD law cannot be found in a 
NME country.  See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia: Final Negative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (May 7, 1984); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland: Final 
Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374 (May 7, 1984). 
54 Cont’l Steel Corp. v. United States, 9 C.I.T. 340, 342 (1985).  The CIT held that the ITA had 
misinterpreted the CVD law by concluding it did not apply to NME countries.  The court noted an 
absence of clear legislative intent, and emphasized the plain language of the statute that applies to 
any country, regardless of political or economic status. Id. at 347–50. 
55 Georgetown Steel Corp. et al. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
56 See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia, et al., Office of Policy, Import Administration, to 
David M. Spooner, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, on Whether the Analytical Elements 
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while China should still be considered a NME country,57 its economy 
was significantly different from the Soviet-style economies analyzed in 
Georgetown Steel where central planners dictated prices, investment 
decisions, credit availability, wage rates, and also restricted foreign 
currency and private ownership of property. 58  As a result, the ITA 
concluded that the current state of the Chinese economy was sufficiently 
market-like to permit the agency to determine whether the Chinese 
government had bestowed a benefit on a Chinese producer and whether 
such a benefit was a specific countervailable subsidy.59 The ITA justified 
this policy change in part because of China’s accession to the WTO and 
the numerous economic reforms undertaken by China pursuant to its 
accession. 60  As a result of the ITA’s decision, numerous CVD 
investigations on products exported from China have been initiated since 
2007.61 This phenomenon has precipitated vociferous accusations from 
the Chinese government that the DOC is imposing duplicative remedies 
by simultaneously treating China as a ME country for CVD purposes and 
as a NME country for AD purposes.62 
III. DOUBLE COUNTING IN U.S. COURTS: GPX INT’L TIRE CORP. V. 
UNITED STATES 
The issue of duplicative remedies in concurrent AD and CVD 
investigations first arose in U.S. courts in 2009 with GPX International 
Tire Corp. v. United States.63 The case followed an investigation of new 
pneumatic off-the-road tires imported from China.64 The DOC initiated 
the investigation in 2007 after several U.S. tire manufacturers and a trade 
association filed petitions seeking the imposition of ADs and CVDs on 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable to China's Present–Day Economy 10 (Dep’t of 
Commerce Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Georgetown Steel Memorandum], available at 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-sep-rates/prc-cfsp/china-cfsgeorgetown-applicability.pdf. 
57  The DOC determined that China should be considered a NME country in Preliminary 
Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value, Greige Polyester Cotton Print Cloth from China.  
48 Fed. Reg. 9897 (March 9, 1983). 
58  Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 56 at 10.  According to the DOC, the 
Government of China acknowledges that the changing nature of its economy justifies the application 
of CVD remedies even though China is still considered a NME country.  See Protocol of Accession 
of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (November 23, 2001), at section 15(b), available at 
http://www.wto.org; see also Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic 
of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,360 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 17, 2007) (prelim. affirm. determination). 
59 Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,645 (Dep’t of 
Commerce October 25, 2007) (final affirm. determination) and the accompanying Issues and 
Decision Memorandum, at 10. 
60 Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 71,360, 71,363; see, e.g., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 
WT/ACC/CHN/49 (October 1, 2001), at ¶ 4, available at http://www.wto.org. 
61 See Lauren W. Clarke supra note 1, at 823 n.10 (2011). 
62 Because the only two NME countries currently recognized by the ITA that have significant 
volumes of trade with the U.S. are China and Vietnam, the scope of this issue is primarily limited to 
exports from those two countries. See Jones, supra note 51, at 63. 
63 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.- 
64 Id. 
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tire export companies.65 The DOC pursued concurrent AD and CVD 
investigations.66 It selected, as mandatory respondents,67 the three largest 
Chinese producers and exporters of OTR tires: Guizhou Tire Co., Ltd. 
(Guizhou), Hebei Starbright Tire Co., Ltd. (Starbright), and Tianjin 
United Tire & Rubber International Co., Ltd. (TUTRIC). 68  The ITC 
made an affirmative material injury determination in both the AD and 
CVD investigations.69 In the CVD investigation, the DOC determined 
that several of the alleged subsidies were countervailable, including: the 
receipt of certain loans from Chinese banks;70 government provision of 
rubber inputs; government forgiveness of debt; government provision of 
land for less than adequate remuneration; and certain tax subsidies.71 The 
Department also made a positive determination of sales at less than fair 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
65 See Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 71,360 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 17, 2007).  
66 See Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 44,122 (Dep't Commerce Aug. 7, 2007); Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the 
People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,591 (Dep't Commerce Aug. 6, 2007). 
67 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(e) stipulates that the DOC calculate an individual countervailing subsidy 
rate for each exporter or producer investigated. The subsidy rate is found by dividing the weighted-
average net amount of the subsidy conferred on a particular company by the company’s total sales in 
the case of domestic subsidies or the firm’s total exports in the case of export subsidies. However, if 
a large number of exporters or producers are involved, the DOC is permitted to select a limited 
number of mandatory respondents and calculate individual rates for these exporters/producers and 
apply an estimated rate for all exporters/producers not individually investigated.  19 U.S.C. § 1671 
(2006); see also THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY ORDERS 
AND SUSPENSION AGREEMENTS 2–9 (U.S. International Trade Commission ed., 1995). 
68 Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 51,624, 51,625 (Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 4, 2008) (amend. final affirm. determination of sales 
at LTFV and AD order); Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of 
China, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,480, 40,483 (Dep't Commerce July 15, 2008) (final affirm. CVD 
determination and final neg. determination of critical circumstances). GPX International Tire 
Corporation is a U.S. importer of off-the-road tires and wholly owns Hebei Starbright Tire Co., Ltd.  
GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. 
69 See Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 51,842 (ITC Sept. 5, 2008) (affirm. injury determination). 
70 The loans, some of which were issued by state-owned commercial banks, were allegedly 
granted on a preferential, non-commercial basis. To calculate the benefit of the subsidy provided by 
the loans, the DOC compared the amount paid for the loans by the recipients with a benchmark 
interest rate calculated using a regression-based methodology based on the inflation-adjusted interest 
rates of countries with similar per-capita gross national incomes as China.  Certain New Pneumatic 
Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,360, 71,367 (Dep’t of 
Commerce Dec. 17, 2007) (prelim. affirm. CVD determination). In most CVD investigations, the 
DOC uses comparable commercial loans reported by the respondents as a benchmark to measure the 
benefit, if any, conferred by the loan in question. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.505 (2012). However, in this 
case the only loans reported by the respondents were provided by state-owned commercial banks as 
part of the Government Policy Lending program. Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from 
the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. at 71,364. Because the DOC does not treat loans as 
commercial if they are received from a government bank as part of a government program, it 
determined in this case that it was appropriate to use a national interest rate for comparable 
commercial loans. Id.; see 19 C.F.R. § 351.505 (2012). However, the DOC does not consider the 
Chinese national interest rate to be reliable as a benchmark because of the pervasiveness of 
government intervention in the Chinese banking sector.  Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires 
from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. at 71,364–65; see 19 C.F.R. § 351.505. 
71 Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 71,364 (prelim. affirm. CVD determination) and accompanying Issues & Decisions 
Memorandum 9–23. 
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value in the AD investigation. 72  The AD margins applied to the 
mandatory respondents were: 29.93% for Starbright, 8.44% for TUTRIC, 
and 5.25% for Guizhou.73  The CVD margins applied were: 14% for 
Starbright, 6.85% for TUTRIC, and 2.45% for Guizhou. 74  GPX 
International Tire Corporation, Ltd. (GPX), the parent company of 
Starbright, challenged the final results of the AD and CVD investigations 
in the CIT.75 
A. CIT Decision in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States 
 
In the CIT, GPX alleged that the application of both CVDs and ADs 
using the NME AD methodology resulted in double counting of duties 
and punished the Chinese companies twice for the same allegedly 
“unfair” trading practice.76 The alleged double counting resulted from the 
DOC applying CVDs to offset domestic subsidies and then comparing a 
subsidy-free constructed normal value (calculated by using either 
surrogate country prices or factors of production) with the original 
subsidized export price to calculate the dumping margin.77 GPX argued 
that domestic subsidies in the NME context should be given the identical 
treatment as export subsidies in the ME context when the DOC is 
conducting concurrent CVD and AD investigations using the NME AD 
methodology.78 The CIT held that while the DOC can apply CVD to 
NME countries, 79  if it does so in conjunction with the NME AD 
methodology the DOC has to apply methodologies that make the parallel 
remedies reasonable and double counting unlikely to occur.80 The CIT 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
72 The DOC assigned separate rates to the twenty-three entities that demonstrated eligibility for 
separate-rate status and a PRC-wide rate to all other exporters of the subject merchandise. See 
Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 
40,485, 40,487–88, (Dep’t of Commerce July 15, 2008) (final affirm. determination of sales at 
LTFV and partial affirm. determination of critical circumstances). In determining the PRC-wide rate, 
the DOC applied facts available and used adverse inferences in choosing among the available facts 
because the ‘PRC-wide entity’ failed to respond to a request for information. Id. at 40,488.  The 
DOC defined the ‘PRC-wide entity’ as all exporters other than those that qualified for separate rate 
status. Id. The DOC determined that the ‘PRC-wide entity’ failed to respond because there were 
actually more exporters of off-the-road tires from the PRC than the number of PRC exporters that 
responded to the Quantity & Value Questionnaire and full antidumping questionnaire. Id. As a result 
of the application of adverse facts available (AFA), while the separate rate weighted average 
dumping margins applied ranged from 0-29.93%, the PRC-wide rate applied was 210%.  Certain 
New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,624–01, 
51,626, (Dep’t of Commerce September 4, 2008) (notice of amend. final affirm. determination of 
sales at LTFV and AD order). 
73 GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1236. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1240. 
77 Id. at 1241. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1240. 
80 Id. at 1243.  Due to the difficulty of calculating the exact effect of subsidies on prices, the 
court held that it was unreasonable for the DOC to place the burden of proof of showing double 
counting on the respondent during the investigation. Id. 
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reasoned that because the CVD statute is ambiguous,81 and therefore 
susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations,82  and the DOC has 
broad discretion in determining the existence of a subsidy under the 
CVD law.83 Hence, it was reasonable for the DOC to apply the CVD 
statute to a NME country. 84  However, given the high likelihood of 
double counting85  and the fact that the DOC can reasonably remedy 
domestic subsidies using only the NME AD methodology,86  the CIT 
concluded that it was not reasonable for the DOC to apply CVDs without 
adjusting for duplicative remedies.87 Significantly, the court did not say 
that the DOC must make an automatic adjustment in any instance of 
concurrent ADs and CVDs, but instead stated that the DOC must only 
make an attempt to determine if double counting is occurring and then 
remedy it if necessary.88 
B. CAFC decision in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States 
The United States government appealed the CIT decision89 to the 
CAFC.90 The CAFC reversed the CIT decision and held that The DOC 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
81 See id. at 1238–39. 
82 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). 
83 See Magnola Metallurgy, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
84 GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. 
85 See id. at 1242–43; see, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 28. 
86 GPX (2009), 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 715 F.Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010) 
(vacated by GPX Intern. Tire Corp. v. U.S., 678 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). In the initial CIT 
decision in GPX (2010), the court remanded the case to the DOC to either not apply CVD or to 
attempt to eliminate duplicative remedies. See id. at 1343. The DOC decided to continue applying 
CVD but offset the amount of CVDs against the calculated AD deposit rates. See id.  The CIT held 
that this methodology was not reasonable because the language of the then-existing CVD statute did 
not permit such an offset and because of “the expense associated with conducting an additional 
investigation that is essentially useless.” See id. at 1345. The DOC had considered three alternatives 
to avoid double counting: not applying CVDs; treating the respondents as market-oriented 
enterprises (MOEs); or offsetting the CVDs against the NME ADs after using its regular 
methodologies to calculate the CVDs and NME AD margins. Final Results of Redetermination 
Pursuant to Remand 8 (Dep't Commerce Apr. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Remand Results]. The DOC 
chose the offsetting methodology as the ‘least objectionable,’ Remand Results at 8, implementing it 
by offsetting a respondent’s calculated export subsidy rate against its calculated AD margin for 
purposes of determining the AD cash deposit rates. Remand Results at 12 n.3; see also Dupont 
Teijin Films USA, LP v. United States, 407 F.3d 1211, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The court noted that 
with this offset methodology, the combination of the CVD margin and the NME AD cash deposit 
rate will always equal the unaltered NME AD margin, rendering concurrent CVD and AD 
investigations unnecessary, “because the same remedial price adjustment can otherwise be obtained 
by merely conducting an NME AD investigation.”  See GPX, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.  Given the 
time and expense of a CVD investigation, the court held it was not reasonable to “force[ ] foreign 
parties to spend many months and large sums of money to go through an investigation, the end result 
of which is to calculate a CVD margin, but then to eliminate that CVD [margin] because it has been 
offset by some parallel investigation.” See id.  The government and U.S. manufacturers favoring the 
imposition of CVD remedies appealed this decision to the CAFC.  GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United 
States, 666 F.3d 732, 737 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
90 GPX, 666 F.3d at 732.  The CAFC reheard the case following the passage of the statute.  See 
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. U.S., 678 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
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may not apply the CVD statute to NME countries.91 The CAFC based its 
decision on the theory of legislative ratification established in a previous 
CAFC case, Georgetown Steel.92 In Georgetown Steel, the CAFC held 
that it was reasonable for The DOC to conclude that CVD law does not 
apply to NME countries because economic incentives and benefits 
provided by a centrally planned government cannot be considered a 
“bounty” or “grant” under the meaning of the CVD statute.93  
Subsequently, Congress amended and reenacted the CVD statute in 
1988 and 1994 without incorporating language applying it to NME 
countries,94 thereby demonstrating both that it was aware of the judicial 
interpretation and accepted it by reenacting the statute without change.95 
In response to the CAFC’s decision in GPX96 Congress passed a statute 
in 2012 specifically authorizing the application of CVDs to NME 
countries.97 
IV. DOUBLE COUNTING AT THE WTO: UNITED STATES – DEFINITIVE 
ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ON CERTAIN 
PRODUCTS FROM CHINA (US-AD/CVD) 
The issue of duplicative remedies, as applied in concurrent AD and 
CVD investigations, has been litigated at the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) of the WTO. In 2008, in response to the increasing number of 
concurrent AD and CVD investigations, China requested consultations 
with the United States through the DSB. 98  Despite the fact that the 
consultations proved unsuccessful and the United States blocked China’s 
first request for a panel, 99  a panel was eventually convened in 2009 
following China’s second request.100 Among other issues, China alleged 
that the concurrent U.S. countervailing and antidumping duty measures 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
91 GPX, 666 F.3d at 739. 
92 Id. 
93 Georgetown Steel Corp. et al. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
94 In 1988 Congress passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–418, 102 Stat. 1107. Legislative history of 
the act indicated that Congress intentionally rejected a prior version of the House bill that included a 
provision applying CVD law to NME countries. See §§ 1311–1337.  In 1994 Congress passed the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), which changed the 
‘bounty’ or ‘grant’ terminology to ‘subsidy,’ but did not substantively alter the meaning of the term.  
See STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ON THE URUGUAY ROUND, H.R. Doc. No. 103–316, 
at 925 (1994). 
95 See GPX, 666 F.3d at 739–40, 745. 
96 Id. at 745. 
97 See infra Section V for further discussion; See Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions 
To Nonmarket Economy Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012). 
98 Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter AD/CVD Panel Report].   
99Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011) (adopted Mar. 25, 2011), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds379_e.htm. 
100 AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶¶ 1.1-1.3. 
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imposed on four Chinese products101 were inconsistent with Articles VI:3 
and I:1 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 10, 12.1, 12.8, 19.3, 19.4 and 
32.1 of the SCM Agreement.102 
V. Panel Ruling in US-AD/CVD 
China argued that because of the surrogate, market-determined NME 
AD methodology, simultaneous application of U.S. CVD law resulted in 
domestic subsidy being offset twice.103  China noted the longstanding 
U.S. policy of not applying CVD to NME countries104 and that the DOC 
recognizes that its methodology of calculating ADs can offset domestic 
subsidies in the ME context.105 The United States strongly disputed that 
the DOC’s NME AD methodology precisely offsets subsidization.106 The 
United States claimed it was not clear that subsidies reduced the cost of 
production on a pro rata basis, and therefore would be fully accounted 
for in a dumping margin.107 Nor that the substitution of actual, subsidized 
values of factors of production with surrogate, unsubsidized values 
inflates the normal value in an amount equal to the subsidy. 108  The 
United States also claimed that the covered agreements did not prohibit 
the imposition of double remedies in the case of domestic subsidies.109 
The Panel ruled in favor of the United States with respect to every 
major issue raised, dismissing China’s “as-applied” claims 110  under 
Articles 10, 19.3, 19.4, and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 
of the GATT 1994.111 While the Panel reaffirmed the basic precept that 
concurrent use of AD and CVD laws may result in double remedies,112 it 
concurred with the United State’s assertion that the existence of double 
remedies in any given case depends on the facts, specifically whether the 
subsidy in question results in the reduction of the export price.113 The 
Panel then determined that none of the provisions of the SCM 
Agreement or the GATT 1994 cited by China 114  prohibited the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
101 The four products covered in the investigations were: (i) Circular Welded Carbon Quality 
Steel Pipe; (ii) Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires; (iii) Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and 
Tube; and (iv) Laminated Woven Sacks.  AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶ 2.2.   
102 Id. ¶ 14.44. 
103 Id. ¶ 14.47.  
104 Id. ¶ 14.48. 
105 Id. ¶ 14.49. 
106 See id. ¶¶  14.54-14.59. 
107 Id. ¶ 14.55. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. ¶ 14.86. 
110 The Panel found that the ‘as such’ claims made by China with respect to SCM Articles 10, 
19.3, 19.4, and 32.1 and Articles I:1 and VI of the GATT 1994 were outside its terms of reference 
because China had failed to include them in its request for consultations.  Id. ¶¶ 14.11, 14.12, 14.36. 
111 See Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade, 45 INT'L LAW, 79 (2011). 
112 AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶¶ 14.70-14.72. 
113 Id. ¶ 14.71. 
114 The Panel declined to take account of the CIT decision, GPX (2009), which concluded that 
U.S. law required the DOC to avoid offsetting the same subsidies twice when it uses its NME 
methodology in countervailing duty and antidumping investigations. See Bentes, supra note 112  
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imposition of both ADs and CVDs with respect to domestic subsidies.115  
The Panel relied heavily on the fact that the SCM provisions116 cited 
by China did not reference concurrent remedies or antidumping duties, 
and therefore concluded that the provisions should be read narrowly to 
only impose limitations on the application of countervailing duties.117 
The Panel focused particularly on Article 19.4, which prohibits 
countervailing duties in excess of the amount of existing subsidy.118 The 
Panel looked to the ordinary meaning of the text119 and concluded that 
the terms of the provision referred only to the amount of existing subsidy 
in a countervailing duty investigation.120 The Panel reasoned that the 
concurrent application of ADs and CVDs by the Department did not 
violate Article 19.4 because China failed to demonstrate that the 
application of NME AD duties affected the amount of existing subsidy in 
CVD investigations. 121  Similarly, when the Panel considered Article 
19.3, which requires that subsidies be levied “in the appropriate 
amounts,”122 it interpreted the provision to mean that the DOC imposes 
countervailing duties in the appropriate amounts if the duties do not 
exceed the amount of existing subsidy.123 Thus, China failed to prove 
that the DOC violated the SCM provisions governing those issues124 
because China did not demonstrate that the imposition of NME ADs, in 
the context of a concurrent CVD investigation, affects the existence of a 
subsidy, the amount of existing subsidy, or the appropriate amounts of 
countervailing duties.125 
Additionally, the Panel took a contextual approach to interpreting the 
relevant agreements, noting that AD and CVD are regulated under two 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
115  See AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶¶ 14.112, 14.115, 14.117, 14.130, 14.136, 
14.138. 
116 The only provision cited by China that does reference concurrent AD and CVD remedies is 
GATT Article VI:5, which the Panel interpreted narrowly to apply only to concurrent remedies in 
cases involving export subsidies, not domestic subsidies.  See id. ¶ 14.117.  
117 See id. ¶ 14.112. 
118 The text of Article 19.4 reads: “No countervailing duty shall be levied on any imported 
product in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist, calculated in terms of subsidization 
per unit of the subsidized and exported product.”  SCM Agreement, supra note 3, at Article 19.4; see 
also Dukgeun Ahn, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 761, 765 (2011). Appellate Body Report, supra note 100. 
119 AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 98, ¶ 14.108.  
120 Id. ¶ 14.112. 
121 Id. ¶ 14.139. 
122 Article 19.3 reads: “When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such 
countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory 
basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be subsidized and causing injury.”  SCM 
Agreement, supra note 3. 
123 AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶ 14.128. 
124 Id. ¶ 14.139.  The Panel also found that Articles 12.1 and 12.8 of the SCM Agreement, which 
require a state agency conducting a CVD investigation to give notice to interested WTO Member 
states, did not require the DOC to adopt criteria to assess the occurrence of double remedies or to 
disclose what evidence would be necessary to establish the existence of a double remedy. Id. ¶¶ 
14.147, 14.148. 
125 Id. ¶ 14.138. 
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separate and distinct agreements126 as well as two separate and distinct 
paragraphs of Article VI of the GATT 1994. 127  The provision that 
references the application of ADs and CVDs, GATT Article VI:5, only 
applies to export subsidies,128 which the Panel interpreted as inapplicable 
to domestic subsidies.129 The Panel also found it significant that a prior 
agreement on subsidies and CVD, the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, 
explicitly provided for the concurrent application of ADs and CVDs to 
NME countries. 130  The Panel interpreted the prior existence and 
termination of this provision to mean the drafters of the SCM Agreement 
were aware of the issue and chose not to address it in Article 19.4.131 The 
Panel also rejected China's claims under Article I:1. In its view China 
failed to establish that the DOC “maintains a consistent ‘policy’ or 
‘practice’ of taking all necessary steps to avoid the imposition of double 
remedies,”132 in investigations of ME countries, and therefore the U.S. 
does not confer an advantage on ME countries with respect to NME 
countries.133  
VI. Appellate Body Ruling in US-AD/CVD 
China appealed to the Appellate Body, 134  which substantially 
reversed the Panel findings.135 The Appellate Body focused on Article 
19.3 of the SCM Agreement,136 which requires that subsidies be levied 
“in the appropriate amount.”137  
While the Panel interpreted Article 19.3 in light of Article 19.4 to 
mean that the amount of subsidies levied must not exceed the amount of 
subsidies found to exist, 138  the Appellate Body determined that this 
approach would be too restrictive and would render 19.3 redundant.139 
Instead the Appellate Body looked to other provisions of the SCM 
Agreement. It noted the causal link made between the injury suffered and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
126 These are the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (Antidumping 
Agreement) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, respectively. 
127 AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶ 14.116. 
128  Article VI:5 of the GATT 1994 ("No product of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization.”). 
129 AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶ 14.117. 
130 Id. ¶ 14.119. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. ¶ 14.181. 
133 See id. ¶¶ 14.168, 14.182. 
134 Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (March 11, 2011) [hereinafter AD/CVD AB 
Report] available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us-adcvdchina(ab).pdf. 
135 See Bentes, supra note 112. 
136 AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 135, ¶¶ 547–58. 
137 SCM Agreement, supra note 3, at Article 19.3. 
138 AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶ 14.128, AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 135, at ¶ 
547. 
139 AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 135, ¶¶ 555–56. 
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the amount of subsidies levied in Article 19.2,140 as well as the GATT 
1994, and determined that the SCM Agreement and the Antidumping 
Agreement must be read together in context. 141  The Appellate Body 
concluded that it would effectively circumvent the rules of both 
agreements to permit “the levying of a total amount of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties which, if added together, would not be appropriate 
and would exceed the combined amounts of dumping and subsidization 
found.”142  
The Appellate Body also rejected the Panel’s reliance on both the 
exclusion argument that GATT Article VI:5 references only export 
subsidies and therefore excludes domestic subsidies.143 Additionally, the 
Panel disregarded the omission argument that the concurrent AD-CVD 
provision in the prior Tokyo Round Subsidies Code was not included in 
the SCM Agreement.144  
After concluding that Article 19.3 prohibits double counting,145 the 
Appellate Body determined that the investigating authority, the U.S., has 
an obligation to investigate and establish that subsidies are not being 
offset twice by concurrent ADs and CVDs.146 However, the Appellate 
Body did not say that the investigating authority must make an 
adjustment in any instance of concurrent ADs and CVDs, only that the 
investigating authority must conduct an investigation to ascertain if an 
adjustment is necessary.147 In this instance, the DOC failed to investigate 
whether double remedies arose from the concurrent NME AD and CVD 
investigations.148 Therefore, the Appellate Body found that the U.S. had 
violated its obligations under Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement.149 
 
VII. P.L. 112-99: CONGRESS’S RESPONSE TO GPX INTERNATIONAL 
TIRES AND US-AD/CVD 
 
In response to both the CAFC decision in GPX International Tires 
and the Appellate Body decision in US-AD/CVD,150 the U.S. Congress 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
140 SCM Agreement, supra note 3, at Article 19.2 (“The decision whether or not to impose a 
countervailing duty in cases where all requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the 
decision whether the amount of the countervailing duty to be imposed shall be the full amount of the 
subsidy or less, are decisions to be made by the authorities of the importing Member. It is desirable 
that . . . the duty should be less than the total amount of the subsidy if such lesser duty would be 
adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.”). 
141 AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 135, ¶¶ 571–72. 
142 Id. at ¶ 572. 
143 Id. at ¶ 580. 
144 Id. at ¶ 581. 
145 Id. at ¶ 590. 
146 Id. at ¶ 602. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at ¶¶ 603–05. 
149 Id. at ¶ 606. 
150 See Alan Beattie, US Congress plans to override court on tariffs, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 29, 
2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9be8c946-62f8-11e1-b837-00144feabdc0.html; Dan Ikenson, 
Congress Poised to Escalate U.S.-China Trade War, FORBES (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2012/02/29/congress-poised-to-escalate-u-s-china-trade-
war/.  
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passed Public Law 112-99, “Application of Countervailing Duty 
Provisions to Nonmarket Economy Countries.”151 The statute amended § 
701 of the Tariff Act of 1930.152 It added a general provision153 that 
stipulated that countervailing duties will apply to merchandise imported 
from a NME country.154  
P.L. 112-99 also amended § 777A of the Tariff Act of 1930155 to 
allow the DOC to adjust AD duties in cases involving concurrent 
application of CVD.156 The DOC can make these adjustments when a 
subsidy has reduced the average export price of the subject merchandise 
and the DOC can reasonably estimate the extent that a countervailable 
subsidy increased the weighted average dumping margin of the subject 
merchandise.157 
There are two forums in which this statute, or the DOC’s 
implementation of it, can be challenged. A respondent in a concurrent 
AD/CVD investigation, to whom the DOC applies § 1677(f)(1), can 
challenge the DOC’s final determination in U.S. court by bringing a 
claim to the Court of International Trade.158 Alternatively, China, or any 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
151 The CAFC ruled on GPX Tires in December 2011; Public Law 112-99 was passed in early 
March 2012. See Beattie, supra note 150; Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions To 
Nonmarket Economy Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, § 1(b), 126 Stat. 265 (2012). The legislative 
history of the statute suggests it had bipartisan support and legislators believed the statute was 
necessary to protect U.S. manufacturers from China’s unfair trade practices. See 158 CONG. REC. 
H1165-02 (daily ed. March 6, 2012); see also Frank Vargo, NAM Welcomes Quick Fix to Offset 
China’s Subsidies, SHOPFLOOR.ORG (March 1, 2012), http://shopfloor.org/2012/03/nam-welcomes-
quick-fix-to-offset-chinas-subsidies/24178. 
152 19 U.S.C. § 1671. 
153 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(f)(1) (“Except as provided in paragraph (2), the merchandise on which 
countervailing duties shall be imposed under subsection (a) includes a class or kind of merchandise 
imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States from a nonmarket 
economy country.”). The statute also includes a retroactive provision making it applicable to all 
proceedings initiated on or after November 20, 2006. See Application of Countervailing Duty 
Provisions To Nonmarket Economy Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, § 1(b), 126 Stat. 265, supra, note 
151. 
154 The amended language also introduces an exception in cases where the DOC is unable to 
determine the amount of the subsidy. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(f)(2) (2006) (“A countervailing duty is 
not required to be imposed under subsection (a) on a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold 
(or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States from a nonmarket economy country if 
the administering authority is unable to identify and measure subsidies provided by the government 
of the nonmarket economy country or a public entity within the territory of the nonmarket economy 
country because the economy of that country is essentially comprised of a single entity.”). 
155 19 U.S.C. § 1677(f)(1). 
156 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1) (2006). This provision was made effective from the date the statute 
went into effect. See Pub. L. No. 112-99, § 2(b).126 Stat. 265 (2012), supra, note 151. 
157 Id. 
158 The NME CVD statute has already been challenged as unconstitutional. See Pl.’s Rule 56.2 
Mot. for J. on the Agency R. at 2, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. U.S., No. 08-00285 (Ct. Int’l Trade Aug. 
17, 2012) (No. 366) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief – GPX]; Pl.’s Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency 
R. at 2, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. U.S., No. 08-00285 (Ct. Int’l Trade Aug. 17, 2012) (No. 367) 
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief – Tianjin]. The plaintiffs in GPX, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. and Tianjin, 
filed CIT Rule 56.2 motions for judgment on the agency record to challenge its final AD and CVD 
determinations in Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China. 
See Pl.’s Br. – GPX, at 2; Pl.’s Br. – Tianjin, at 2. The United States and Titan Tire Corp. had 
petitioned the CAFC to rehear its December 19, 2011 decision, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. U.S., 666 
F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011). GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. U.S., 678 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
Following the enactment of P.L. 112-19, the CAFC requested briefing on the new legislation and its 
impact on the proceedings. Id. at 1311. The CAFC then remanded the proceedings to the CIT for 
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other NME country to which the DOC applies § 1677(f)(1), can make a 
request for consultations at the DSB of the WTO.159  
 
A. Consistency of P.L. 112-99 Under U.S. Law 
 
1. Text of P.L. 112-99 
 
Public Law 112-99 is facially consistent with U.S. law. Proponents 
of the House bill (H.R. 4105) in the Ways and Means Committee went to 
great lengths to demonstrate that the language of the bill would overturn 
the CAFC decision in GPX and that it would be consistent with U.S. 
obligations under the WTO.160 Section 1(a), which provides a statutory 
basis for the application of CVD to NME countries, addresses the 
concerns of the CAFC in GPX and is also consistent with U.S. law.161 
With respect to the CAFC decision in GPX, which held that there was no 
statutory basis for the DOC to apply CVD to NME countries, the 
statutory language explicitly authorizes the imposition of CVD in 
investigations of exports from NME countries.162  
Section 2(a) addresses the concerns of the lower court in GPX.163 
Specifically, the CIT held that the DOC must, when it chooses to adjust, 
make a reasonable effort to adjust for duplicative remedies in concurrent 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
consideration of the constitutional issues raised. Id. at 1313. GPX. Tianjin also alleged that P.L. 112-
99 is unconstitutional because the retroactive provision of Section 1(b) violates the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the Constitution and the discrepancy in effective dates between Section 1 and Section 2 
violates the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the 5th Amendment. See Pl.’s Br. – 
GPX, at 2, Pl.’s Br. – Tianjin, at 3. The CIT rejected both of these arguments. The CIT held that the 
Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to P.L. 112-99 because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to 
retroactive penal legislation, and trade remedies laws are remedial, not punitive in nature. GPX Int’l 
Tire Corp. v. U.S., No. 08-00285, Slip Op. 13-2, at 16, 18 (Ct. Int’l Trade Jan. 7, 2013). The CIT 
also held that the law is consistent with due process and equal protection. It found that the 
retrospective nature of the law does not violate due process because customs duties and trade 
remedies are a uniquely retrospective assessment scheme, That means the plaintiffs could not have 
reasonably relied on any predicted duty rate prior to the enactment of the law. Id. at 23–25. The 
Court also upheld the law as consistent with equal protection because the law is rationally related to 
legitimate state interests, namely maintaining administrative efficiency and the finality of the 24 
investigations affected by the retroactivity provision.  Id. at 30–31. 
159  China has already requested consultations with the United States and challenged the 
consistency of P.L. 112-99 with the WTO Agreements, specifically Articles X:1, X:2, and X:3 of the 
GATT 1994 as well as Articles 10, 15, 19, 21, and 32 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI of the 
GATT 1994. Request for Consultations, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Products from China, at 3–4, WT/DS449/1 (Sept. 20, 2012). 
161 Id. 
160 See 158 CONG. REC. H1166-06 (daily ed. March 6, 2012); Summary of “A Bill to Apply the 
Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 to Nonmarket Economy Countries, and For 
Other Purposes,” House Committee on Ways and Means, available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/final_cvd_one_pager.pdf; Press Release, Michelle 
Dimarob, Press Sect., House Ways and Means Committee, Camp, Levin, Brady, and McDermott 
Introduce Legislation to Ensure Commerce Department Can Continue to Apply Countervailing Duty 
Laws to Non-Market Economies Like China (Feb. 29, 2012), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=282425. 
161 See GPX, 666 F.3d 732, 739 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
162 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(f)(1) (2006). 
163 Id. (Section 2(a) amends Title VII, § 777A of the Tariff Act of 1930 by adding §777A(f), 
enacted as 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)). All further citations will be to the United States Code. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW       VOLUME 10 
157 
 
AD/CVD investigations.164 The court also explained that the burden of 
calculating such duplication rests with the DOC.165 The statute states that 
the DOC is to determine whether a countervailable subsidy reduced the 
average price of imports and thereby increased the dumping margin.166 
The statute further instructs the DOC to make adjustments as necessary, 
provided that it can reasonably estimate the extent to which the subsidy 
increased the dumping margin.167  
On its face, the statute adequately addresses the issue of double 
counting. It does so by requiring the DOC to avoid duplicative remedies 
by adjusting the dumping margin in investigations where a 
countervailable subsidy is passed through to lower export prices. To date, 
the methodology the DOC has used to implement Section 2(a) 168  is 
somewhat problematic. However, given the deference accorded federal 
agencies in implementing their authorizing statutes,169 the methodology 
meets the standard of “reasonable or in accordance with law.” 
 
2. Offsetting Methodology of P.L. 112-99 
 
The DOC’s methodology for avoiding duplicative remedies in 
concurrent AD and CVD meets the standard of “reasonable and in 
accordance with law.”170 Section 2(a) of P.L. 112-99, codified as 19 
U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1), requires that a subsidy be offset if the DOC finds 
the subsidy reduced the average price of imports of the class or kind of 
merchandise171 and if the DOC can reasonably estimate the extent to 
which the subsidy increased the weighted average dumping margin for 
the class or kind of merchandise.172 In GPX, the CIT assumed that all 
domestic subsidies received would be passed-through to reduce the 
export price.173 However, the DOC asserts that the effect of domestic 
subsidies on export price in a NME country is too uncertain to support 
this precept. 174  The concurrent AD/CVD investigations the DOC has 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
164 See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). 
165 Id. 
166 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1) (2006). 
167 Id. 
168 See Issues and Decision Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Import 
Administration, for the Final Determination in the Antidumping Investigation of Drawn Stainless 
Steel Sinks from the People’s Republic of China (Feb. 19, 2013) (Dep’t of Commerce) [hereinafter 
Final Determination – Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks]. 
169 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
170 The standard of review in a case challenging a CVD determination is that the court “shall 
hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial 
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) 
(2006).   
171 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(B) (2006). 
172 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(C) (2006). 
173 See GPX, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010) (vacated by GPX Intern. Tire 
Corp. v. U.S., 678 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2009). 
174 See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1242; Issues and Decision Memorandum from Christian Marsh, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, 
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conducted thus far support the conclusion that respondents cannot 
demonstrate that the domestic subsidies they receive are passed-through 
pro rata to reduce export prices. 
The DOC has conducted several concurrent AD/CVD investigations 
since implementing P.L. 112-99.175 It has used a methodology that was 
initially developed in the Section 129 reviews, which were conducted 
after the US-AD/CVD decision to root out duplicative remedies. 176 
Following the Appellate Body ruling in US-AD/CVD, the DOC 
conducted Section 129 reviews of the four challenged AD/CVD 
investigations to bring them into compliance with the Appellate Body 
ruling.177  
Section 129 reviews provide some insight 178  into the reasoning 
behind the DOC’s current methodology for mandating the estimation of 
duplicative remedies.179 However, the DOC was facing a strict deadline 
when it conducted the Section 129 reviews and has since refined its 
methodology in several significant ways. 
 
a. Offsetting Methodology Used in Section 129 Reviews. As stated 
earlier, the DOC conducted Section 129 determinations180 on four non-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, for the Final Determination in the Antidumping 
Investigation of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, 
from the People's Republic of China, at 53?58 (Oct. 9, 2012) (Dep’t of Commerce). 
175 Final Determination – Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 168. 
176 Issues and Decision Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Import 
Administration, for the Preliminary Determination in the Antidumping Investigation of Drawn 
Stainless Steel Sinks from the People’s Republic of China (Sept. 27, 2012) (Dep’t of Commerce), 
available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2012-24549-1.pdf, [hereinafter 
Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks]; Final Determination – Drawn Stainless Steel 
Sinks, supra note 168, at 4. 
177 See, e.g., Memorandum from Christopher Mutz, Office of Policy, Import Administration, & 
Daniel Calhoun, Office of the Chief Counsel, Import Administration, to Paul Piquado, Assistant 
Secretary, Import Administration, on Section 129 Determination of the Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China: “Double Remedies” 
Analysis Pursuant to the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WTO DS 379 (May 31, 2012) (Dep’t 
of Commerce) [hereinafter Section 129 Determination – Laminated Woven Sacks]. 
178 The DOC qualified its determinations in the Section 129 investigations with the caveat that 
they were conducted on a compressed timeline and noted that the agency’s administration of 19 
U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f) will likely evolve with time and experience. See Memorandum from Christopher 
Mutz, Office of Policy, Import Administration, & Daniel Calhoun, Office of the Chief Counsel, 
Import Administration, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, on Section 129 
Determination of the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road 
Tires from the People’s Republic of China: “Double Remedies” Analysis Pursuant to the WTO 
Appellate Body’s Findings in WTO DS 379, at 7 (May 31, 2012) (Dep’t of Commerce) [hereinafter 
Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires]. 
179 The DOC found that P.L. 112-99 applied, subject to subsection (c) of Section 129 of the 
URAA, to “all determinations issued under subsection (b)(2) of that section on or after the date of 
the enactment of this Act,” which included the Section 129 determinations. See, e.g., id. at 6. 
180 Section 129(b)(2) of the URAA provides that notwithstanding any provision of the Act, upon 
written request from the U.S. Trade Representative, the DOC will issue a determination that would 
render its actions not inconsistent with an adverse finding of a WTO panel or the Appellate Body. 
Such relief is prospective only. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, § 
129(c)(1)(B), 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
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compliant AD/CVD investigations.181 In each of these reviews, the DOC 
used the same methodology to estimate the extent the subsidies lowered 
the respective export price of the applicable goods. Rather than 
requesting data from the individual mandatory respondents, the DOC 
looked at industry-level data 182  and concluded that manufacturers in 
China changed prices in response to increases in input costs over the 
previous month.183  
The DOC found that the increases in input costs were related to 
changes in variable cost.184 Additionally, it determined that in the case of 
input price subsidies, the only evidence that connected a subsidy with 
lower export prices was the subsidy-variable cost link.185 However, the 
DOC could only estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through for 
subsidies that were likely to have impacted variable costs.186 Therefore, 
the DOC excluded from its investigation all subsidies other than those 
related to input production costs.187  
This severely limited the scope of the DOC’s determinations. For 
instance, in the Section 129 determination covering certain pneumatic 
off-the-road tires, the DOC determined that it could only be 
demonstrated that one type of subsidy reduced the average cost of 
imports, per 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(B), input subsidies.188 In the off-
the-road tires CVD investigation, input subsidies only accounted for one 
of the countervailable subsidies in the original investigation, namely the 
government provision of rubber for less than adequate remuneration.189 
The DOC thereby excluded all the other types of subsidies in the original 
investigation from its pass-through estimation. The exclusions include: 
government policy lending, government debt forgiveness, the provision 
of land, stamp tax exemption on share transfers, tax subsidies and local 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
181 See Section 129 Determination – Laminated Woven Sacks, supra note 177; Memorandum 
from Christopher Mutz, Office of Policy, Import Administration, & Daniel Calhoun, Office of the 
Chief Counsel, Import Administration, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, 
on Section 129 Determination of the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Circular Welded Carbon 
Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China: “Double Remedies” Analysis Pursuant to 
the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WT/DS 379 (May 31, 2012); Memorandum from 
Christopher Mutz, Office of Policy, Import Administration, & Daniel Calhoun, Office of the Chief 
Counsel, Import Administration, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, on 
Section 129 Determination of the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Light-Walled Rectangular 
Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of China: “Double Remedies” Analysis Pursuant to the 
WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WT/DS 379 (May 31, 2012); Section 129 Determination – OTR 
Tires, supra note 177. 
182 Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 177, at 8. 
183 Id. at 9. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 See Certain New Pneumatic Off–the–Road Tires From the People's Republic of China, 73 
Fed. Reg. 40,480, 40,484 (July 15, 2008) (final affirm. CVD determination and final neg. 
determination of critical circumstances). 
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income tax exemption and reduction programs, VAT and tariff 
exemptions, and the State Key Technology Renovation Project Fund.190 
The DOC also estimated the extent its proxy for subsidies affected 
export prices. To accomplish this estimation the DOC used the 
following: the average ratio of rolling monthly, year-on-year changes in 
production input costs; changes in an aggregate production input price 
index as a proxy for input costs to monthly, year-on-year changes in ex-
factory prices; changes in an aggregate producer price index as a proxy 
for ex-factory prices; and data for the manufacturing sector in China 
available through Bloomberg’s electronic terminal database.191 This ratio 
of price-cost changes “estimates the extent of price responsiveness 
during the period of investigation to changes in variable cost for 
producers in China.”192  
Because the DOC relied on data from the entire manufacturing 
sector, its estimate of the extent subsides impacted export prices was 
identical in all four determinations and “approximately 63.07 percent of 
the value of the subsidies that . . . impacted variable costs . . . were 
‘passed through’ to export prices.” 193  In the off-the-road tires 
investigation, this estimation resulted in an average reduction of the cash 
deposit rate. 194  In other words a correction of approximately .08% 
applied to the original AD.195 This low percentage is representative of the 
results of the few investigations conducted to date. It demonstrates the 
limited practical effect of requiring the DOC to investigate and make an 
adjustment for duplicative remedies in concurrent AD/CVD 
investigations. The DOC qualified its determinations in the Section 129 
reviews, stating that the analysis was limited by a short timeline and that 
the agency’s methodology might evolve over time.196 
 
b. Offsetting the Methodology Used in Subsequent Investigations. 
In the investigations conducted after the Section 129 reviews, the DOC 
improved its methodology for implementing 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f). It 
did so while reiterating that its application of the law will continue to be 
refined.197 In the investigations since the first four, the DOC changed its 
approach by sending questionnaires to respondents to find which 
countervailable subsidies reduced the respondents’ cost of manufacturing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
190 See id. 
191 Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 165, at 9–10. 
192 Id. at 10. 
193 Id. 
194  Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, on 
Final Determinations: Section 129 Proceedings Pursuant to the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in 
WT/DS 379 Regarding the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of Certain New 
Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, at 38–41 (July 31, 2012) 
[hereinafter Final Determination Section 129 – OTR Tires]. 
195 Id. 
196 See id. at 7.   
197 Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 21. 
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(“COM”).198 In both the Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks and the Hardwood 
and Decorative Plywood investigations, the respondents indicated that 
there were cost-to-price linkages for certain countervailable subsidies 
that impact COM.199   
After verifying the information submitted by the respondents, the 
DOC determined that an adjustment was warranted for the identified 
subsidies that demonstrated cost-to-price linkages that affect COM.200 In 
the Hardwood and Decorative Plywood Investigation, the DOC declined 
to make an adjustment. The DOC declined the adjustments after 
determining that the respondents had not provided sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate cost-to-price linkages for the subsidies identified.201   
Another potentially significant difference between the Section 129 
reviews and the subsequent investigations is that in the former, the DOC 
assumed that only input subsidies lower export prices. 202 This was due to 
time constraints and a lack of responsiveness from the GOC.203 In the 
subsequent investigations the DOC solicited information regarding any 
subsidies that lower respondents’ COM,204 including subsidies other than 
input subsidies.205 
The second half of the adjustment methodology, in which the DOC 
attempts to reasonably estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
198 Id. at 22. 
199  Id.; Decision Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Import 
Administration, for the Preliminary Determination in the Antidumping Investigation of Hardwood 
and Decorative Plywood from the People’s Republic of China, at 32 (Apr. 29, 2013) [hereinafter 
Preliminary Determination – Hardwood and Decorative Plywood], available at 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2013-10532-1.pdf. 
200 Final Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 155, at 4. 
201 Preliminary Determination – Hardwood and Decorative Plywood, supra note 199, at 32. 
202 According to the DOC, the record in the Section 129 reviews lacked any evidence that any 
type of subsidy other than input subsidies affects variable cost.  Id. at 22. The DOC also stated that 
the GOC failed to provide evidence to support its claim that the pass-through effect was not just 
limited to input subsidies. Id. In GPX (2009), the CIT held that it was unreasonable for the DOC to 
place the burden of showing double remedies on the respondent due to the difficulty of measuring 
the exact effect of a subsidy on price. 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242?43 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). If the 
DOC conducted a concurrent AD/CVD investigation and placed the burden of proof of showing that 
subsidies other than input subsidies affected variable cost, the court would likely find that the 
resulting determination was unreasonable. The DOC relied on a Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
(CLSA)-Market monthly China PMI report on Manufacturing, which found that Chinese 
manufacturers changed output prices in response to increases in input costs over the previous month 
and that only part of the cost increases were passed on to customers in the form of higher selling 
prices. Id. at 22. As a result, the DOC determined that the only domestic subsidies that reduce import 
prices, per 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(1)(B), are ones that affect variable cost, namely input subsidies, and 
therefore the DOC excluded all other subsidies from its analysis. Section 129 Determination – OTR 
Tires, supra note 165, at 9. The CLSA Report did not analyze the relationship between changes in 
other types of costs and changes in output prices. See Final Determination Section 129 – OTR Tires, 
supra note 179, at 22. 
203 Id. 
204  Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 22; Preliminary 
Determination – Hardwood and Decorative Plywood, supra note 199, at 32. 
205 However, the onus is on the respondent to identify which of the countervailable subsidies 
reduce its COM, which could include a subsidy other than an input subsidy, and assuming the DOC 
is able to verify the cost-to-price linkage identified by the respondent, could result in an adjustment 
for a subsidy other than an input subsidy. 
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export price, remains problematic due to the DOC’s reliance on 
manufacturing sector data rather than firm-specific data. After 
determining that a respondent has adequately demonstrated a cost-to-
price linkage for a countervailable subsidy, the DOC must estimate the 
extent of pass-through in order to make an adjustment to the applied 
antidumping rate.206 In the Section 129 reviews, the DOC used data from 
the Chinese manufacturing sector as a whole to estimate the extent of 
pass-through.207 The DOC did this because it could then match price and 
cost to the subject merchandise and pair cost and price series from the 
same group at the sector level.208 While the DOC acknowledged that 
export prices and U.S. import prices of subject merchandise may be a 
more appropriate price measure than manufacturing sector data,209 data 
constraints prevented them from disaggregating U.S. import data in order 
to match the price and cost series under a subset of the manufacturing 
sector.210   
Additionally, the DOC also used input price inflation to estimate 
pass-through, which it acknowledged is an inexact proxy for the extent of 
subsidy pass-through.211 Similarly, in the Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks 
investigation, the DOC determined that the respondents failed to provide 
sufficient information to calculate company-specific estimates to 
determine the extent of subsidy pass-through. Consequently, the DOC 
declined to utilize the information supplied by respondents regarding 
cost-linked price changes.212 Instead the DOC applied a ‘documented 
ratio of cost-price changes for the Chinese manufacturing sector as a 
whole” to estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through. 213  The 
documented ratio used in the initial determination was approximately 
61%,214 similar to the approximately 63% calculated in the Section 129 
reviews.215 
3. Reasonableness of Offsetting Methodology 
The estimation methodology the DOC developed in the Section 129 
determinations and refined in subsequent investigations are reasonable 
implementations of 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f) because of three factors: the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
206 19 § U.S.C. 1677f-1(f)(1)(C). 
207  See Final Determination Section 129 – OTR Tires, supra note 179, at 22.  The DOC 
compared the rate of change of an aggregate input index and of an aggregate price index to 
determine how much of each CVD rate increased the AD cash deposit rate. Section 129 
Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 165, at 9.  The DOC relied on the record evidence to 
estimate that 63.07% of the subsidies were passed through to export prices and to identify the 
portion of each CVD rate estimated to have increased the AD cash deposit rate.   
208  Id. 
209 Final Determination Section 129 – OTR Tires, supra note 179, at 29. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 26. 
212 Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 21?22. 
213 Id. at 22. 
214 Id. 
215 Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 165, at 10. 
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deferential standard of review applied to the DOC’s implementing 
methodologies; the burden of proof of showing duplicative remedies 
allocated to the respondent; and the applicability of available adverse 
facts. 
 
a. Standard of Review. The standard of review in a case 
challenging an AD or CVD determination is that the court, “shall hold 
unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found ... to be 
unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”216 The two-step framework provided in Chevron 
governs judicial review of the DOC's interpretation and implementation 
of the CVD statute.217 Under Chevron, the court first determines whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If so, the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress governs. If Congress has 
not spoken directly on the issue, the court must determine whether the 
agency responsible for filling a gap in the statute has rendered an 
interpretation that is based on a permissible construction of the statute.218 
If the DOC’s interpretation is reasonable, albeit not the only or even 
preferred reasonable interpretation, it will withstand judicial scrutiny.219 
This standard reflects the legislative intent that the courts afford 
considerable deference to the DOC administration 220  and 
methodology.221 
 
b. Burden of Proof. The deferential standard of review is most 
relevant because 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(B) does not affirmatively 
allocate the burden of proof of demonstrating duplicative remedies. 
According to the DOC, the burden of proof is on the respondent because, 
in a case where a respondent seeks an adjustment of an antidumping 
duty, the burden of proof is on the respondent seeking the adjustment.222 
The DOC considers a calculation to avoid duplicative remedies in a 
concurrent AD-CVD investigation to be an ‘adjustment’ to an 
antidumping duty. Consequently, the respondent alleging duplicative 
duties has the burden to show that a subsidy reduced the average price of 
imports.223  
The statute does not state which party bears the burden of proof. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
216 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
217 See Hiep Thanh Seafood Joint Stock Co. v. U.S., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338 (2012). 
218 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 467 U.S. at 842?43 (1984). 
219 See NSK Ltd. v. U.S., 115 F.3d 965, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
220 See U.S. Steel Group v. U.S., 225 F.3d 1284, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
221 GMN Georg Muller Nurnberg AG v. U.S., 15 C.I.T. 174, 178 (1991). 
222 See Statement of Administrative Action on the Uruguay Round, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 
829 (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(b)(1) (2012); Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. U.S., 88 F.3d 1034, 1040 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996) (“[The DOC] . . . reasonably placed the burden to establish entitlement to adjustments on . 
. . the party seeking the adjustment and the party with access to the necessary information.”). 
223 Section 777A(f)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1), states that the DOC 
is to reduce the antidumping duty if it finds that the countervailable subsidy has been demonstrated 
to have reduced the average price of imports of the class or kind of merchandise during the relevant 
period.  19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(B) (2006). 
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However given the DOC’s interpretation that the initial burden of 
showing pass-through of a countervailable subsidy to lower export prices 
is on the respondent, they should be accorded deference. This 
interpretation is also consistent with other aspects of an AD or CVD 
investigation where respondents have the burden of proof of 
demonstrating facts for which they have greater access to the relevant 
evidence. For example, demonstrating the absence of central government 
control in order to receive a company-specific rate in a NME AD 
investigation. 224 It is reasonable to require a respondent to demonstrate 
that a subsidy is passed through to lower export prices, rather than 
assume that all domestic subsidies are passed through and require the 
DOC to make an automatic adjustment for all countervailable subsidies 
in concurrent AD/CVD investigations. The investigations that the DOC 
has conducted demonstrate that not all subsidies received are used to 
lower export prices. Those subsidies, which do not lower export prices, 
do not implicate a double counting problem necessitating an adjustment 
to the dumping margin.225 
Considering the extreme difficulty of measuring the price effect of 
domestic subsidies,226 it could be argued that it is not reasonable to place 
the burden of proof on the respondent. However, this argument ignores 
the fact that the burden of proving the difficult portion of the estimation 
methodology is actually borne by the DOC. The DOC has the burden of 
reasonably estimating the extent to which the subsidy increased the 
weighted average dumping margin.227  
Based on investigations concerning implementing 19 U.S.C. § 
1677f-1(f), it is reasonable to allocate the initial burden of proof to 
respondents. Respondents should show that a countervailable subsidy has 
a demonstrable cost-price linkage because they are in the best position to 
identify which of the countervailable subsidies affect their COM. 
Moreover, putting the burden of proof on respondents does not impose 
unreasonable hardship above and beyond what is already required of 
them in an ordinary AD or CVD investigation.  
In cases where a respondent fails to provide adequate evidence to 
allow the DOC to verify that a countervailable subsidy is passed-through 
to lower export prices, it is reasonable for the DOC to decline to make an 
adjustment under 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(C). The party that has the 
burden of proof must create an adequate record, 228  and it is not the 
DOC’s obligation to “seek out” information from the respondent.229 If a 
respondent only meets its burden of demonstrating that a subsidy reduced 
the average import price with respect to certain types of subsidies, the 
DOC is not obligated to seek out information showing what effect the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
224 See Qingdao Taifa Grp. Co., Ltd. v. U.S., 710 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1355 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010). 
225 See Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 22. 
226 See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. 
227 19 U.S.C. § 1677f–1(f)(1)(C) (2006). 
228 See Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. U.S., 16 C.I.T. 931, 936 (1992). 
229 See id. at 936. 
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other subsidies had on average import price. 
The weakest aspect of the methodology the DOC uses to make 
adjustments under 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f) is a portion of the estimation 
methodology, § 1677f-1(f)(1)(C), where the DOC attempts to reasonably 
estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through. This estimation 
methodology the DOC has used in this phase of the adjustment process is 
may not be reasonable because it utilizes manufacturing sector-wide data 
as opposed to firm-specific data. This results in an estimation based on 
aggregate price indices rather than the effect of the actual subsidy 
received by the respondent. In the Section 129 reviews, the DOC did not 
consider the actual effect of a specific subsidy, looking instead to 
average changes in an input price index. Additionally, the DOC did not 
limit its analysis to the impact on import prices of like merchandise. 
Instead it looked to changes in an aggregate producer, post-factory price 
index comprised of data from all manufacturing sectors in China.230 The 
DOC used a similar methodology in the Stainless Steel Kitchen Sinks 
investigation, when it applied a Chinese manufacturing sector-wide ratio 
to estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through.231 
Courts have found that the use of aggregate estimates is 
unreasonable in the face of clear legislative intent to the contrary in other 
circumstances, for example in valuing the labor factor of production in 
NME AD investigations.232 In Dorbest v. United States, the CAFC held 
that the DOC’s methodology of valuing the labor factor of production 
under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4) using a regression-based wage rate 
calculated with data from market economy countries was not 
reasonable.233 The statute demonstrates Congress’s clear intent to require 
the use of data solely from economically comparable countries234 that are 
significant producers of comparable merchandise,235 which the regression 
methodology failed to do.236   
Similarly, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(B) states that a subsidy must be 
demonstrated to have reduced the average price of imports of the class or 
kind of merchandise during the relevant period. This shows clear 
legislative intent to have the relevant reduction in average prices be 
caused by a subsidy and limited to imports of like merchandise. The 
methodology the DOC used was overly broad because it used an input 
price index as a proxy for a subsidy. Moreover, it used cost and price 
data for the entire manufacturing sector as a proxy for the average price 
of the like product produced by individual respondents. Therefore, this 
methodology likely underestimated the impact of the relevant subsidies 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
230 See Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 179, at 9–10. 
231 Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 22. 
232 See Dorbest Ltd. v. U.S., 30 C.I.T. 1671, 1703?11 (2006). 
233 Dorbest Ltd. v. U.S., 604 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
234 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(A) (2006). 
235 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(B) (2006). 
236 Dorbest, 604 F.3d at 1371–72. 
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on import prices.237   
 
c. Applicability of Facts Available. The DOC could justify its pass-
through estimation methodology as reasonable and in accordance with 
law by relying on the facts available. The DOC may use “facts otherwise 
available” to make a determination if necessary information is not 
available in the record or if an interested party withholds or fails to 
provide such information. 238  In the Stainless Steel Kitchen Sinks 
investigation The DOC stated that the respondents failed to provide 
adequate information to calculate company-specific estimates of the 
extent of subsidy pass-through.239 This suggests that the application of 
facts available is reasonable and justifies the use of an aggregate 
manufacturing sector proxy. This conclusion is supported by the text of 
the statute, which only requires that the DOC make an adjustment if it 
can reasonably estimate the extent to which a countervailable subsidy has 
increased the weighted average dumping margin.240 In light of the text, 
the DOC could have declined to make an adjustment altogether after 
concluding the information provided by the respondents was inadequate 
to reasonably estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through. 
B. WTO Consistency of P.L. 112-99 
 
1. Text of P.L. 112-99 
 
Public Law 112-99 could alternatively be challenged at the DSB of 
the WTO, however, a challenge in this forum would likely be 
unsuccessful. The statute is ‘as such’ consistent with the WTO 
Agreements and the Appellate Body decision in US-AD/CVD. Section 
2(a), which requires the DOC to make reasonable efforts to determine if 
a subsidy reduced the export price and then reduce the weighted average 
dumping margin by the amount of the subsidy, is consistent ‘as such’ 
with Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body stated that 
in order to be consistent with Article 19.3, the DOC must attempt “to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
237 If the reduction in import prices resulting from the subsidies is underestimated, the amount 
by which the subsidies increase the weighted average dumping will also be underestimated. This 
results in less than the full amount of duplicative remedies being adjusted for.  See 19 U.S.C. § 
1677f-1(f)(2) (2006). 
238  See Gerber Food (Yunnan) Co., Ltd. v. United States, 31 C.I.T. 921, 937–38 (2007).  
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a), the DOC may use facts otherwise available if, (1) necessary 
information is not available on the record, or (2) an interested party or any other person - (A) 
withholds information that has been requested by the administering authority or the Commission 
under this subtitle, (B) fails to provide such information by the deadlines for submission of the 
information or in the form and manner requested, (C) significantly impedes a proceeding under this 
subtitle, or (D) provides such information but the information cannot be verified as provided as 
provided in section 1677m(i) of this title.  If the DOC finds that an interested party has failed to 
cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a request for information, the DOC 
may use adverse inferences in selecting from among the facts available. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) 
(2006). 
239 Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 177, at 22. 
240 See § 777A(f)(1)(A)–(C) of the Act. 
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establish whether or to what degree it would offset the same subsidies 
twice by imposing antidumping duties calculated under its NME 
methodology, concurrently with countervailing duties.”241 Section 2(a) 
directs the DOC to reduce the AD by the amount that a countervailable 
subsidy, that has been demonstrated to reduce the average price of 
imports of like merchandise, has increased the weighted average 
dumping margin. The investigation provided for in Section 2(a) is 
consistent with the type of inquiry the Appellate Body concluded that the 
DOC should have undertaken in US-AD/CVD.242 However, the DOC’s 
implementation of Section 2(a) is more susceptible to challenge as 
inconsistent with GATT Article 19.3.   
2. Offsetting Methodology of P.L. 112-99 
While the DOC’s offsetting methodology would likely be upheld 
both in U.S. court and in WTO dispute settlement, several factors make 
the latter determination a much closer call. These factors include a 
standard of review that accords no deference to the investigating 
authority, the allocation of the burden of proof between the investigating 
authority and the respondent, and the potential applicability of the 
doctrine of facts available. 
 
a. Standard of Review. The standard of review under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement is more stringent than that applied under U.S. law. 
It asks whether a national authority’s establishment of facts was proper 
and unbiased and whether the investigating authority’s interpretation of 
the relevant WTO provision was permissible. 243  Similar to Chevron 
deference, this standard suggests that even if the panel would have 
reached a different decision from that reached by the investigating 
authority, it could still find that the standard is met. However, in practice 
panels tend to find there is only one possible interpretation of the 
Agreement, giving no deference to Member interpretations with which 
they disagree.244 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
241 AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 98, ¶ 604. 
242 See id. 
243 Anti-Dumping Agreement Article 17.6. 
244  In United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from 
Japan, the Appellate Body found that Article 17.6(iii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement’s reference 
to ‘permissible interpretation’ refers to interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, which is permissible under the rules of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, ¶¶ 59–60,(July 24, 2001). In practice, applying the 
pertinent rules of the Vienna Convention, panels have consistently found there is but one way to 
interpret the text. See Appellate Body Report, US–Stainless Steel (Mexico), ¶ 136, WT/DS344/R 
(Dec. 20, 2007) (“In our analysis, we have been mindful of the standard of review provided in 
Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, we consider that Article VI:2 of the 
GATT 1994 and Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, when interpreted in accordance with 
the customary rules of interpretation of public international law as required by the first sentence of 
Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, do not admit of another interpretation as far as the 
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b. Burden of Proof. A WTO panel or the Appellate Body would 
likely allocate the burden of showing whether a subsidy reduces import 
price to the United States. The Appellate Body in US-AD/CVD did not 
specifically address which party, the investigating authority or the 
respondent, has the burden of showing that a subsidy reduces import 
price, butt its analysis suggests it would place the burden of proof on the 
investigating authority. 245  The Appellate Body stated that the 
investigating authority has an affirmative obligation to ascertain the 
precise amount of the subsidy and to establish the appropriate amount of 
the duty under Article 19.3: 
This obligation encompasses a requirement to conduct a 
sufficiently diligent "investigation" into, and solicitation 
of, relevant facts, and to base its determination on 
positive evidence in the record . . . [including] evidence 
of whether and to what degree the same subsidies are 
being offset twice when anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties are simultaneously imposed on the 
same imported products.246  
 
This statement can be interpreted as putting the burden of soliciting 
evidence of the subsidy-import price link on the investigating authority 
and the burden of providing that evidence on the respondent, as the DOC 
alleges.247 However, a panel or the Appellate Body would likely place 
the ultimate burden of demonstrating that a subsidy reduced the average 
import price and therefore resulted in duplicative remedies on the 
investigating authority, using the evidence provided by the respondent. 
The standard for whether the DOC’s offsetting methodology is 
consistent with Article 19.3 is whether the DOC has taken the necessary 
corrective steps to adjust for duplicative remedies248 by conducting a 
sufficiently diligent investigation and soliciting evidence. 249  In the 
Section 129 reviews in US-Softwood Lumber IV,250 the Appellate Body 
upheld a Panel decision finding that the U.S. had failed to conduct an 
adequate pass-through analysis of subsidies in transactions involving 
unrelated parties. 251  This reasoning was justified because the DOC 
solicited company-specific, transaction-by-transaction information from 
the Canadian respondents with respect to some transactions252 but not 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
issue of zeroing raised in this appeal is concerned.”). 
245 See AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 98, ¶ 602. 
246 See id. 
247 Final Determination Section 129 – OTR Tires, supra note 194, at 18. 
248 See AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 98, ¶ 599. 
249 See id. ¶ 602. 
250 Article 21.5 Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/RW (Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter US-
Softwood Lumber IV]. 
251 See id. ¶¶ 4.58–4.62.  
252 See id. ¶ 4.83. 
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others.253  
The Panel held254  that the DOC’s failure to investigate the pass-
through in respect of all the relevant transactions, specifically those 
transactions for which no data was requested, was a failure to properly 
implement the rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body.255 Interestingly, 
the Panel resisted making categorical statements as to the sufficiency of 
using aggregate data versus company-specific or transaction-specific 
data to analyze the pass-through effect of a subsidy.256 Similarly, in the 
Section 129 reviews conducted following US-AD/CVD, the DOC’s 
investigation was not sufficient because its attempts to solicit evidence of 
duplicative remedies were not specific to the firms that received the 
subsidies. After failing to receive satisfactory responses from the 
GOC,257 the DOC failed to make additional requests for information and 
instead relied on a publicly-available report that did not address the price 
effect of subsidies other than input subsidies.258 In contrast, in the Drawn 
Stainless Steel Sinks and Hardwood and Decorative Plywood 
investigations, the DOC did request information from the individual 
mandatory respondents regarding which of the subsidies under 
investigation impacted their cost of manufacturing and the cost-linked 
price changes resulting from the subsidies under investigation.259 As a 
result, the investigations conducted subsequent to the Section 129 
reviews meet the standard of a sufficiently diligent investigation, at least 
with regard to the initial burden of demonstrating that the countervailable 
subsidies reduce export prices. 
As previously discussed, this phase of the offsetting methodology, 
involving the use an estimate as a proxy for subsidy pass-through, is 
more problematic. In order for the DOC’s implementation of Section 
2(a) of P.L. 112-99 to comply with US-AD/CVD, The DOC must 
investigate the price-effect of each subsidy under investigation and 
thereby determine whether an adjustment for duplicative remedies is 
necessary. 260  By applying an aggregate price proxy for the 
countervailable subsidies and only considering manufacturing sector 
level data, the DOC arguably did not adequately account for the pass 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
253 See id. ¶ 4.104.  The Canadian respondents provided aggregate data for the transactions for 
which data was requested. Id. ¶ 4.83. Canada alleged that the DOC presumed pass-through for the 
transactions for which no data was requested. Id. ¶¶ 4.93–4.94.  
254 The Panel’s Article 21.5 Report was appealed to the Appellate Body by the U.S. The appeal 
challenged whether the Panel’s First Assessment Review was within the scope of Article 21.5. 
However, it did not challenge the substance of the pass-through analysis in the First Assessment 
Review. Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, ¶ 96.  The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s 
determination that the First Assessment Review fell within the scope of Article 21.5. Id. ¶ 95. 
255 Id. ¶ 4.106. 
256 See id. ¶¶ 4.88–4.89. 
257 Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 194, at 8. 
258 Id. at 9. 
259 Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 22. 
260 Under US-Softwood Lumber IV, the aggregate data methodology utilized by the DOC might 
have been sufficient had it specifically accounted for each challenged subsidy; however, the 
conclusion that only input subsidies impact average import prices is not supported by record 
evidence. 
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through of each challenged subsidy and potentially applied duplicative 
remedies. However, as in the analysis under U.S. law, the DOC’s 
estimation methodology for subsidy pass-through could be consistent 
with Article 19.3 and the Appellate Body decision in US-AD/CVD if the 
doctrine of facts available applies. 
 
c. Applicability of Facts Available. The second phase of the 
offsetting methodology is consistent with Article 19.3 and the AB 
decision in US-AD/CVD due to the applicability of facts available. 
Neither US-AD/CVD nor Canada-Softwood Lumber IV addressed the 
issue of when a Member may resort to using aggregate or proxy data 
when the information provided by respondents is not deemed sufficient 
to estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through. The relevant provision of 
the Antidumping Agreement is Article 6.8, which states:  
 
In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, 
or otherwise does not provide, necessary information 
within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the 
investigation, preliminary and final determinations, 
affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the 
facts available. The provisions of Annex II(402) shall be 
observed in the application of this paragraph. 
 
The applicability of facts available is narrower under WTO 
jurisprudence than it is under U.S. law. For example, under U.S. law, the 
DOC may find that a respondent who failed to provide information that 
was not specifically requested but which the respondent should have 
known was necessary to an investigation impeded that investigation, 
thereby justifying the application of facts available.261  In contrast, in 
Argentina-Ceramic Tiles, the Panel held that, “an investigating authority 
may not fault an interested party for not providing information it was not 
clearly requested to submit.”262 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
261 See Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 31 C.I.T. 1416, 1423 (2007). 
262 Panel Report, Argentina — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Carton-Board Imports 
from Germany and Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Tiles from Italy, ¶ 
6.54 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Argentina-Ceramic Tiles]. See also id. ¶ 6.55 (“Paragraph 1 of 
Annex II of the [Anti-Dumping] Agreement on the ‘Use of Best Information Available in Terms of 
Paragraph 8 of Article 6’ reiterates the obligation of Article 6.1. It states that: 1. As soon as possible 
after the initiation of the investigation, the investigating authorities should specify in detail the 
information required from any interested party, and the manner in which that information should be 
structured by the interested party in its response. The authorities should also ensure that the party is 
aware that if information is not supplied within a reasonable time, the authorities will be free to 
make determinations on the basis of the facts available, including those contained in the application 
for the initiation of the investigation by the domestic industry.’ Thus, the first sentence of paragraph 
1 requires the investigating authority to ‘specify in detail the information required,’ while the second 
sentence requires it to inform interested parties that, if information is not supplied within a 
reasonable time, the authorities may make determinations on the basis of the facts available.  In our 
view, the inclusion, in an Annex relating specifically to the use of best information available under 
Article 6.8, of a requirement to specify in detail the information required, strongly implies that 
investigating authorities are not entitled to resort to best information available in a situation where a 
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Due to the DOC’s inadequate efforts to solicit information, the DOC 
could not justify the results of the Section 129 reviews based on facts 
available. However, the DOC’s efforts in the subsequent investigations 
do meet the standard necessary for applying facts available. In the 
Section 129 reviews, the DOC requested industry-level information from 
the GOC, but concluded that the responses were inadequate.263 Due to 
time constraints, rather than make additional requests for information, 
the DOC based its determination on other information on the record, akin 
to invoking facts available.264  
In contrast, in the Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks investigation, the 
DOC requested information from the individual respondents and made 
subsequent requests for information in an attempt to calculate company-
specific pass through rates before resorting to applying the 
manufacturing sector-wide rate to estimate subsidy pass through. 265 
Given that the DOC investigated manufacturers individually, requested 
information relating to specific subsidies, and chose to utilize an 
aggregate estimate, the application of facts available is reasonable. 
Consequently, the investigation in Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks is more 
likely to meet the standard of sufficiently diligent than that conducted in 
the Section 129 reviews, regardless of the fact that the DOC eventually 
resorted to utilizing the same imprecise proxy mechanism to estimate 
pass-through in both investigations. 
VIII. IMPACT OF SUNSETTING PROVISION IN CHINA’S ACCESSION 
PROTOCOL 
It is also worth noting that the issue of double counting will likely 
become moot with respect to China in 2016 when, under the terms of 
China’s accession to the WTO, China’s non-market economy status is set 
to expire. Article 15 of China’s Accession Protocol permits importing 
Members to treat China as a non-market economy in antidumping and 
countervailing duty investigations if certain conditions are met.266 Article 
15(d) of the Accession Protocol states:  
 
Once China has established, under the national law of 
the importing WTO Member, that it is a market 
economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be 
terminated provided that the importing Member's 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
party does not provide certain information if the authorities failed to specify in detail the information 
which was required.”). 
263 Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 165, at 7-8. 
264 Id. at 8–9. 
265 Issues Final Determination – Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 177, at 5. 
266 See Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Art. 15, WT/L/432 (Nov. 
23, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/379abr_e.pdf; Yaling Zhang, 
The Link Between Countervailing Duty Investigations and Non-Market Economy Status in Light of 
United States: Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
19 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 13, 15 (2010). 
SUMMER 2014                       Putting the Specter of Double Counting to Rest 
172 
 
national law contains market economy criteria as of the 
date of accession. In any event, the provisions of 
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date 
of accession.267  
 
However, the obligation under Article 15 is not as all encompassing 
as some commentators have suggested. Article 15(d), the provision in 
China’s Accession Protocol that provides for China’s NME status to 
expire in 2016refers specifically to another provision, Article 15(a)(ii), 
which by its own terms applies only to AD investigations. In practice this 
means that Article 15 will eliminate the DOC’s flexibility in AD 
investigations to select a surrogate country benchmark. This resolves the 
double counting problem that arises due to the calculation of a dumping 
margin using a surrogate country. However, the provision does not 
require the United States to fully recognize China as a NME country. 
Consequently, the decision whether to alter China’s NME status will 
remain subject to the discretion of the DOC,268 which is unlikely to elect 
to alter China’s NME status without significant evidence of relevant 
reform.269  
Given the applicability of Article 15, the issue of double counting 
due to concurrent application of CVDs and NME ADs with respect to 
China could be moot as of 2016. However, this assumes that the DOC 
ceases utilizing the NME AD methodology, based on surrogate country 
values, and does not replace it with a methodology that gives rise to the 
same issues. It should also be noted that the DOC has begun conducting 
concurrent CVD and NME AD investigations with respect to products 
from Vietnam. 270  Since Vietnam did not negotiate a comparable 
provision to Article 15 in China’s Accession Protocol when it acceded to 
the WTO, there is no restriction on the DOC’s continued application of 
its concurrent CVD-NME AD methodology to Vietnam, or any other 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
267 Id. 
268 See, e.g., Christian Tietje and Karsten Nowrot, Myth or Reality? China’s Market Economy 
Status under WTO Anti-Dumping Law after 2016, POLICY PAPERS ON TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW NO. 34, Dec. 2011, at 7. 
269  The DOC reviewed China’s NME status in 2006 and determined that while China has 
implemented significant economic reforms with respect to some of the factors, the market forces in 
China were not yet sufficiently developed for the DOC to changes its status as a NME country. Id. at 
5. The DOC focused particularly on the fifth factor, government control of the allocation of 
resources, concluding that the GOC was still deeply entrenched in resource allocation, particularly in 
the banking sector. Id. at 77. Based on its 2006 analysis, the DOC would likely require evidence of 
significant economic and legal reforms in order to reach a different conclusion with respect to 
China’s NME status. Id. at 81 (“Firms in industries that are dominated by the private sector also 
operate in a business environment distorted by state presence and the weakness–or absence–of the 
legal and institutional factors that underlie functioning markets, e.g., rule of law and property rights, 
and meaningful bankruptcy laws.”); see Kimberly A. Tracey, Non-Market Economy Methodology 
under U.S. Anti-Dumping Laws: A Protectionist Shield from Chinese Competition, CURRENTS: INT'L 
TRADE L.J. 81, 87 (2006). 
270 See, e.g., Certain Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 77 
Fed. Reg. 75, 973 (Dec. 26, 2012) (final affirmative countervailing duty determination); Certain 
Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 77 Fed. Reg. 75,980 (Dec. 26, 
2012) (final determination of sales at less than fair value). 
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NME countries, post-2016. Consequently, double counting will continue 
to be an issue of contention when the DOC conducts concurrent AD and 
CVD investigations involving products from NME countries. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Avoiding duplicative trade remedies in the concurrent application of 
NME AD and CVD is a complicated issue. Public Law 112-99 
adequately addresses the issue of double counting by requiring the DOC 
to determine in concurrent AD/CVD investigations whether or not 
countervailable subsidies are passed through to reduce export price and 
adjust the dumping margin accordingly. This resolves the issue of double 
counting because only subsidies that are passed through to reduce export 
price have an impact on the dumping margin and consequently would 
give rise to duplicative remedies.  
The statute also satisfies the standards laid out in both the U.S. court 
decisions in the GPX cases and the WTO Appellate Body decision in 
US-AD/CVD, ensuring that the United States is in compliance with its 
international obligations under the GATT and its associated agreements. 
Depending on how the DOC chooses to implement the obligation in the 
sunsetting provision in China’s Accession Protocol to stop applying the 
NME AD methodology after 2016, the double counting issue may 
disappear with respect to China. However, the DOC is likely to take a 
narrow approach in interpreting the extent to which the sunsetting 
provision limits its ability to utilize NME methodologies. For example, 
calculating the normal value based on a surrogate country factors of 
production, such that there will still be a potential for duplicative 
remedies. Additionally, the DOC has already begun applying CVD 
duties to the other major U.S. trading partner currently treated as a NME 
country, Vietnam. This means it is all the more important for the DOC to 
improve its adjustment methodology. More specifically, in order to 
remain in compliance with the United States’ WTO obligations, the 
methodology can be improved by refining the estimating subsidy pass-
through to allow for the calculation of firm-specific pass through rates of 
individual firms for individual subsidies. 
